[Hjemmeside](https://www.quantumcomputing.no) [Redigeringslenke](https://www.quantumnorway.no/wp-admin) Leder: Franz Fuchs ([Sintef](https://www.sintef.no/en/all-employees/employee/franz.fuchs/)) [Tidligere mĂžter](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4UwNl8HibLA&list=PL7eADhfNLlSqneWl4u5ZfWQw6hOsRnvEi&pp=iAQB) Tidligere kjent som *Gemini Center on Quantum Computing*. - [ ] #to-do đŸ«  Annonser pĂ„ [[Blog]] (+ Bluesky?) om fornyelsen đŸ”„ - [ ] #to-do đŸ«  Legg til pĂ„ [[Hjemmeside]] - [x] #to-do ⏳ NĂ„r du fĂ„r siste versjon av GeminisĂžknaden, send inn som tema til Norsk KryptorĂ„d. - [x] #to-do đŸ«  Legg til i CV I sĂžknad om fornyelse splittes Geminisenteret i tre "tracks": - Quantum Computing (endelig navn?), ledet av Franz - Quantum Sensing and Materials (endelig navn?), ledet av [Marianne Bathen](https://www.mn.uio.no/smn/english/people/aca/mariebat/) - "We're the hardware track." - [[Gemini Quantum Communication and Security Track]], ledet av meg **Ledere over hele Gemini-rammeverket** (mĂžtt i dialogmĂžte [[12025-10-15]]): - [Rune Aarlien](https://www.sintef.no/en/all-employees/employee/rune.aarlien/) - [Petter StĂža](https://www.sintef.no/en/all-employees/employee/petter.stoa/) **Ledere** - Franz Fuchs (senteret + computing track) - Marianne (sensing track) - Meg (communication and security track) [Medlemmer](https://www.quantumcomputing.no/about-us/) som jeg har sett eller truffet: - NTNU: - [[Meg|meg!]] - Jeroen Danon (fysikk) - Dragana (CS) - Kristian GjĂžsteen (dukker sjeldent opp) - Finley Quinton - PhD-student (begynte 2025), jobber med QAOA, sitter i Sentralbygg 1 - Presenterte pĂ„ compute track 12025-09-19 - UiO: - Nadia Larsen (matematiker) - Alexander Mueller-Hermes (matematiker) - Simen Kvaal (kjemiker, traff i Trondheim) - Sergiy Neshveyev (matematiker) - Erik BĂ©dos (matematiker, ikke listet som medlem) - Sintef: - Franz - Alexander Stasik (cybernetics) - Ruben Bassa (cybernetics PhD student) - Simula UiB: - Carlos Sid (dukker sjeldent opp) - [Morten Øygarden](https://www.simula.no/people/morten.oygarden/) (har holdt talk, men ikke listet som medlem) - [Hsuan-Yin Lin](https://www.simula.no/people/lin/) (har holdt talk, men ikke listet som medlem) - SRL: - Shaukat Ali (har aldri dukket opp) Fra Ă„rlig mĂžte pĂ„ NTNU, [[12023-03-17]]: ![[Pasted image 20240214114435.png]] ### Tanker om Crypto Track Sendt til Franz, Marianne, Nadia og Jeroen (og delt med Carlos og Morten), [[12024-12-19]]: > Here’s my reasoning for the track name, plus some thoughts about the direction of the crypto track in general: > > - Post-quantum cryptography is in essence still _classical_ cryptography, and most of the design and analysis of these schemes do not involve any quantum theory at all. There are exceptions, namely trying to come up with quantum attacks better than the best known classical attacks (hard, as it turns out), as well as certain quantum-theoretical proof techniques used in some proofs of security for PQ schemes (specifically, for whenever a hash function is used as part of a construction; this is where my own research currently lies). > - However, the study of PQ cryptography could be seen as being fundamentally in opposition to the world that the Gemini Center is advocating: A world where quantum computers are ubiquitous and available, which cryptographers mostly view as a development we need to be “protected from”. Coming up with new ways to attack existing cryptography using quantum computers doesn’t fare much better in that regard.  > - Therefore, the focus of the crypto track might benefit from taking a more optimistic view, in which we are all working together to bring our quantum future to life, but ensuring that we do so in a _secure manner_. (This was the point Carlos was making to me yesterday.) > - Additionally, there are already plenty fora for the (classical) study of PQ cryptography, i.e. cryptography _against_ quantum computing. What’s currently missing is a forum advocating the study of cryptography _for_ quantum computing. > - More specifically, in a protocol involing two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, intercepted by Eve the Eavesdropper, there are several questions one could ask: > > - 1. What if Alice and Bob are classical, but Eve is quantum? Then you need PQ crypto. > - 2. What if A and B have a classical task they would like to perform, but are using quantum communication protocols as an enabling technology? Then you get into the realm of _classically impossible primitives and protocols_, with QKD being the best known example. There are plenty other (and imo more interesting) protocols however, such as (publicly) verifiable certified deletion, one-time signature tokens, and public-key quantum money.  > - 3. What if all parties are quantum _and_ the goal is to perform a quantum computation, and to then share the result over a quantum channel? Then we get into the question of what happens when you boot up classical cryptography onto quantum computers. Do they work the same? These questions require novel security notions, which exist, but are regularly discarded by cryptographers as being “too esoteric. However, this direction is not only a perfect fit for the focus of this center, but a necessary ingredient for the future we are advocating. There are in fact examples of cryptographic schemes that can be proven secure against any quantum eavesdropper, but that are easily broken by Simon’s Algorithm when the client itself is a quantum computer, showing that this is something that is important to consider! > - 4. Finally, what if A and B are _classical_, but are offloading their computations to quantum _servers_—which may or may not be honest about the work they are performing, and may or may not be communicating/colluding with other quantum computers in a larger quantum network? Then we get into the realm of [classical verification of quantum computing](https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.01082 "https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.01082") and [quantum fully homomorphic encryption](https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.02130 "https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.02130") (both of which saw amazing breakthroughs due to Urmila Mahadev a few years ago), as well as quantum multi-party computation and the like. > >To summarize, I think that focusing on cryptography _for_ rather than _against_ quantum computing would serve the center well in the sense that it fits better with the vision we are advocating, while giving a platform to topics that are too often brushed off as too esoteric by “serious” cryptographers—yet that are important and necessary pieces of the puzzle when bringing full-scale quantum computing to life. Additionally, we avoid stepping on the toes of existing fora for the study of and transition to post-quantum cryptography. > >As for the name, I would love to use the term “quantum cryptography”, however this term has already been hijacked by the QKD people, and I want to make it clear that our scope is broader. Additionally, swapping out _cryptography_ for _security_ clarifies that we are also welcoming quantum information theoretists who study protocols for privacy and security, such as Private Set Intersection in a quantum setting (there are QIT theorists studying this in Bergen for instance), while highlighting that this is part of a unified vision in bringing our quantum future to life in a _secure_ manner. > >Of course, post-quantum cryptography _could_ still be included under the same umbrella, should you feel that this is appropriate for the center. If so, I think it would be appropriate for the focus to be on the aforementioned quantum attacks and quantum proof techniques. > >Let me know your thoughts! > >Best, Hans